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Abstract. While the threat of cybersecurity breaches—unauthorised access to networks, applications, and data—
should be a priority for businesses and organizations, it is likewise a priority for government’s worldwide, and, in 
particular, governments are working on rules and standards intended to protect controlled unclassified information 
in public procurements. This is an important issue because governments share vast quantities of sensitive data with 
contractors through public procurements. Governments are increasingly realizing that this poses a significant risk 
to national security and steps should be undertaken to protect controlled unclassified information (CUI). The 
purpose of this article is to identify and compare those rules and standards in the United States and the European 
Union on the protection of controlled unclassified information and provide general recommendations. Overall, this 
article concludes by confirming that there are differences between the approaches taken by the US and EU to protect 
controlled unclassified information and that a uniform approach in the EU is recommended. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to identify and compare the rules and standards in the United States (US) and 
the European Union (EU) on the protection of controlled unclassified information.  This is an area of concern 
because governments are some of the leading users of information technology in the world, and they oversee vast 
quantities of sensitive data which is often shared with contractors through public procurements. If this information 
is compromised through cyber-security breaches, it is possible that the national security of a country could be 
compromised. Countries have been slow to introduce measures and procedures to protect controlled unclassified 
information, despite the increasing number of attacks and breaches and the vast quantities of data held by 
individual countries and their public contractors. The EU and the US have taken vastly different approaches to 
this problem and there are pros and cons to each approach. Part One of this paper will explore the overall problem 
of the theft of intellectual property. 
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